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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the spatial interaction of neighboring cities over their employment 
cycles.  The cycles of neighboring cities tend to be more similar to one another than are 
those of non-neighboring cities, although this is due primarily to neighbors’ tendency to 
be in the same state.  In addition to these same-state effects, neighborness interacts with 
industry and human capital in ways that make the cyclical interaction of neighbors 
different from that of non-neighbors.  Specifically, neighboring cities with similar levels 
of educational attainment and establishment size tend to have more-similar employment 
cycles, but neighboring cities with similar racial compositions tend to have less-similar 
employment cycles. 
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I. Introduction 
 Just as the national business cycle is often characterized as a sequence of 
expansion and recession phases, local-level employment growth can be described as a 
sequence of switches between periods of expansion and contraction—an employment 
cycle.  As demonstrated by Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005, 2010), state and city 
employment cycles can differ substantially from the national cycle, and national 
recessions have tended to spread in recession-specific geographic patterns.
1
  City-level 
cycles also differ from one another:  During 1990-2008, the employment cycles of a 
typical pair of large U.S. cities were in the same phase 71 percent of the time, and cities 
in the same state or region tended to have more-similar cycles.  Strikingly, however, 
similar industrial mixes did not translate into similar employment cycles (Owyang, Piger, 
and Wall, 2010).   
 This paper focuses on the employment cycles of neighboring cities—i.e., large 
contiguous cities within the same metro area.  The economies of neighboring cities are 
relatively integrated, so one might expect them to have similar employment cycles.
 
 Even 
if macroeconomic shocks directly affect neighboring cities differently, the cities’ 
interrelatedness might mean that each city’s shock propagates spatially to affect each 
other.  Countervailing this notion, however, are models of urban systems, which allow 
the possibility that neighboring cities have divergent employment cycles.  For example, 
                                                 
1
 The effects of the 1990-91 recession, for example, began much earlier on the coasts before spreading 
inward and receding to the regions from which it sprang.  The effects of the 2001 recession, however, were 
felt earliest in the middle of the country before spreading to the coasts and, eventually, receding to the 
middle. 
2 
 
in the evolutionary hierarchy models of Fujita and Mori (1997) and Fujita, Krugman, and 
Mori (1999), neighboring cities arise out of a single evolutionary process through which 
one agglomeration center becomes two, each serving a different set of functions within 
the metro-area economy.  If cities with similar functions have similar cycles, and there is 
a consistent division of functions across metro areas, then cities in the same position on 
their metro areas hierarchy will have similar cycles.    
 This paper is a contribution to the urban systems literature in that its purpose is to 
determine the links, if any, between the employment cycles of neighboring cities.  
Because of its methodology and attention to relatively high-frequency data, the paper 
follows directly from the literature applying the tools of empirical macroeconomics to 
geographically disaggregated data.
2
  To a large extent, this macro/urban/regional 
literature exists as separate from the rest of urban/regional economics in that it has tended 
to look at the myriad high-frequency time-series differences across geographic entities 
within the U.S. rather than addressing traditional urban questions: The word 
―agglomeration‖ appears only rarely.3  The present paper departs from these roots by 
focusing on the spatial and agglomerative links between cities, offering a new perspective 
on the organization of cities and the links between them. 
                                                 
2
 Notable papers in this literature include, but are not limited to, Carlino and Mills (1993); Carlino and 
DeFina (1995, 1998, 1999, 2004); Clark (1998); Carlino and Sill (2001); Del Negro (2002); Partridge and 
Rickman (2002, 2005); Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2008); Owyang, Rapach, and Wall (2009); and Hamilton 
and Owyang (forthcoming). 
3
 This literature does, however, share the general outlook of the urban system literature which sees the 
overall economy as a grouping of interrelated subnational economies (Abdel-Rahman and Anas, 2005). 
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 For my analysis, I take at face value the statistical criteria for metro divisions 
within a metropolitan statistical area.
4
  Metro divisions fit the notion of neighboring cities 
very well in that they are distinct but related cities, each large enough to have its own 
agglomerative process.
5
  My data set is quarterly payroll employment for 25 metro 
divisions within 10 of the 11 MSAs that have metro divisions as components.  I excluded 
the four metro divisions of the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy MSA, three of which are 
relatively small, because the Markov-switching model has a difficult time separating 
employment growth into expansion and contraction phases for small cities.  Consistent 
data and definitions are available for the 25 metro divisions (henceforth, cities) back to 
1990.Q1 and my data ends with 2009.Q1, currently the most recent quarter not subject to 
rebenchmarking.   
 I find that, on average, the employment cycles of neighboring cities are more 
similar than are those of the average city pair, but that this effect of neighborness 
disappears once I control for the fact that neighboring cities tend to be the same state and 
region.  Controlling for these and other factors, I find no evidence that neighboring cities 
have similar employment cycles solely because of their neighborness.  On the other hand, 
neighborness interacts with industry and human capital in ways that make the cyclical 
                                                 
4
 According to the General Accounting Office (GAO-04-758), the combination of two or more adjacent 
metro division occurs when the employment interchange measure is at least 25.  This measure is the sum of 
the percentages of residents the metro divisions who work in the other metro division.  For employment 
interchange between 15 and 25, local opinion can be used to determine that two metro divisions are in the 
same MSA.  Dobkins and Ioannides (2001), for example, found the growth rates of neighboring cities to be 
interdependent. 
5
 Note that the these distinctions are devised largely from county-level data and that more-granular data will 
yield more subcenters (McMillen and Smith, 2003).  See also Berliant and Wang (2008). 
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interaction of neighbors different from non-neighbors.  For neighbors, employment 
cycles are related to similarities in mean establishment size, racial composition, and 
educational attainment.  Also, in a result that harkens back to Christaller’s (1933) central 
place theory and modern models of urban hierarchy, the employment cycles of the largest 
cities across metro areas tend to be similar to one another.  In other words, a city’s place 
in the urban hierarchy will play a role in determining how macroeconomic shocks affect 
its employment cycle.  
II.  City Employment Cycles 
 To determine each city’s pattern of expansion and contraction, I apply the 
Markov-switching model of Hamilton (1989) to city-level employment data.  The 
estimation procedure is a straightforward application of Kim and Nelson (1999), the 
details of which are outlined in Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005).  In this model, an 
employment cycle is assumed to have two phases—expansion and contraction—which 
the city economy switches between infrequently.  Each phase has its own structure and, 
therefore, its own growth rate.
6
  Deviations from the two growth rates are treated as 
noise.  Put simply, the model compares a city’s actual employment growth rate to its two 
phase growth rates and determines the probability that the city’s employment is in 
contraction.  Persistence matters in that the probability of being in contraction depends on 
the previous period’s growth rate.  The model performs well for large cities, i.e., the 
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 Owyang, Piger, Wall, and Wheeler (2008) find that expansion growth rates are related to some of the 
usual variables used in growth regressions, but that these variables are not related to contraction growth 
rates.   
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probability of contraction is usually close to either one or zero (Owyang, Piger, and Wall, 
2010).  By convention, a period is determined to be contractionary if the estimated 
probability of contraction exceeds 0.5. 
 The cities’ employment cycles are summarized by Table 1, which lists the cities 
in order of their MSA and Metro Division identification numbers.  Note that, because the 
estimation uses growth rates, 1990:1 is excluded.  Quarters for which the cities are in 
contraction are denoted with a ―∎‖ and expansionary quarters are blank, and periods of 
national employment contraction are indicated by a shaded background.  As should be 
clear from the table, there is a strong tendency for any city to be in contraction around the 
same time as the country as a whole, indicating the occurrence of common 
macroeconomic events.  Nonetheless, a city’s cycle can differ a great deal from that of 
other cities and the country as a whole:  (i) Some cities did not experience employment 
contraction at all during periods of national contractions; (ii) City-level contractions need 
not be in synch with each other; and (iii) Cities can experience idiosyncratic contractions 
when nearly all other cities are in expansion.   
 As shown elsewhere for a larger set of cities, there is a broad geographic pattern 
to the occurrence of city employment contractions (Owyang, Piger, and Wall, 2010).  My 
present focus, however, is on the narrow patterns between neighboring cities.  
Specifically, an examination of Table 1 reveals that there can be substantial differences in 
the employment cycles of neighboring cities, although some neighbors are closely 
related.  For example, Dallas-Plano-Irving and Fort Worth-Arlington are very much in 
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synch; whereas Washington-Arlington-Alexandria and Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithersburg 
have relatively little in common; and Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, Gary, and Lake County-
Kenosha hardly look like cities within the same metro area.   
 To measure the extent to which two city employment cycles are in synch, I use 
their concordance, that is, the percentage of time the two cycles are in the same phasee 
(Harding and Pagan, 2002).  More precisely, the concordance between the employment 
cycles of cities i and j is  
      (1)                                       ,11100
1

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C  
where Sit and Sjt equal 1 when city i or j is in contraction, and zero otherwise.  T is the 
number of time periods.  Applying this to the occurrence of employment contractions 
summarized by Table 1 yields measures of concordance for each of the 300 city pairs.  
The remainder of the paper examines these concordances, with particular focus on the 
concordances between cities within the same metro area. 
III. Conceptual Framework 
 The mean concordance across all 300 city pairs is 74.4, meaning that, on average, 
two cities were in the same phase of the employment cycle 74.4 percent of the time.  
Pairs of contiguous cities in the same metro area tended to be in synch more often than 
this, 81.7 percent of the time, so, arithmetically, the employment cycles of neighboring 
cities were more closely related than average.  Finding the effect of neighborness is not as 
simple as calculating this number, however, because doing so ignores that each city plays 
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simultaneous roles in its own metro area and in the broader system of urban areas.  In 
such a system, each city is linked in some way to each of the other cities (its city effect is 
the average of these) and to its neighbor by virtue of overlapping agglomeration 
(neighborness).  These two roles need to be separated from one another in the event that 
the city effects are correlated with neighborness.   
 The potential importance of city-specific effects is illustrated in Table 2, which 
provides cities’ mean concordances within their own metro area and with all other cities.  
By comparing the two columns one can see a strong tendency for cities to be more in 
synch with their neighbors than with the entire set of cities.  Still, six cities—Chicago-
Naperville-Joliet, Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, Warren-Farmington Hills-Troy, Miami-
Miami-Beach-Kendall, Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, and Bethesda-Frederick-
Gaithersburg—were more in synch with their non-neighbors than with their neighbors.  
Note also the large difference in the cities’ mean concordances with other cities overall: 
Five had mean concordances lower than 70 and four had mean concordances higher than 
80.   
 Further confounding a clear estimate of neighborness is that neighboring cities 
tend to be in the same state, although not always.  Indeed, as reported in Table 3, the 
mean concordance of city pairs whose principal cities lie in the same state is higher than 
that for cities in the same metro area, 83.5 versus 73.9.  It’s beyond the present scope, but 
an obvious possibility is that differences in state-level policies affect the timing and the 
length of employment cycles, thereby accounting for at least some of the above-average 
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intra-metro concordance.  Such policies might include corporate and personal income tax 
rates, unemployment insurance benefits, sales taxes, banking regulation, minimum wage, 
etc.  Further, some city pairs have a secondary state link in that one city’s outer counties 
are in the same state as the principal city and/or outlying counties of the other.  Because 
the mean concordance for these city pairs is also above average (79.3), there is some 
evidence that this secondary link might matter .   
 To differing degrees, every metro area has one main city at the top of the local 
hierarchy and serves as something like a central place.  The fact that neighbors tend to 
develop into such a hierarchy suggests a separation of roles and functions within a metro 
area.  The largest city, for example, might include headquarters and offices while the 
smaller city contains space-intensive activities such as production and transport.
7
  If the 
different functions, even within the same industry, are affected differently by 
macroeconomic shocks, then cities in the same tier of the urban hierarchy might tend to 
have similar employment cycles.  There is certainly evidence of this as the average 
concordance between the largest cities in each metro area is 80.7.  
 When separating the determinants of concordance, keep in mind that each metro 
areas in the sample was formed through its own combination of geography and chance, 
so their component cities will have their own positions in the metro area’s hierarchy.8  
The evolution of the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana MSA, for example, can be 
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 See Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens (2009) for a theoretical treatment along these lines. 
8
 See Dobkins and Ioannides (2001) for a detailed look at the development of neighboring cities in the 
United States. 
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thought of as having followed something like the evolutionary process of Fujita and Mori 
(1997) and Fujita, Krugman, and Mori (1999):  Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine began life as 
the hinterlands of what is now Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale before developing its 
own agglomeration center and status as a large city.  The development of Dallas-Fort 
Worth-Arlington, on the other hand, bears little resemblance to such a process.  It became 
a metro area as the existing cities of Dallas and Forth Worth grew toward one another, 
eventually becoming a more-unified system that could be categorized as a metro area.  
 As reported in Table 4, measures of agglomeration differ more between neighbors 
than between non-neighbors, indicating that there is something distinct about the 
development of neighbors relative to each other.  Specifically, the average difference in 
the number of establishments between non-neighbors was 65.5 thousand, whereas the 
average difference between neighbors was 95.2 thousand, about 45 percent larger.  
Further, the average difference in the number of establishments per square mile was 30.4 
for non-neighbors and 41.0 for neighbors, 35 percent higher.   
 Finally, as reported in Table 4, between-neighbor differences in industrial mix 
and human capital are smaller than the differences between non-neighbors.  The average 
sum of the absolute differences in industry shares of employment is 19.8 for neighbors, 
but 25.4 for non-neighbors.  Clark (1998), for one, demonstrates how employment 
fluctuations can be decomposed into national, subnational, and industry shocks, with each 
playing a significant role.  Although our fluctuations are at a much lower frequency than 
those considered by Clark, it’s not unreasonable to believe that industrial similarity is 
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related to employment cycle similarity.  This was not found by Owyang, Piger, and Wall 
(2010), but they did not focus on the role that industrial similarity might play between 
neighboring cities.  Similarly, human capital similarity might play a special role for 
neighbors:  The sum of absolute difference in race shares is 21.7 for neighbors and 26.1 
for non-neighbors, and neighbors have more-similar levels of educational attainment.  On 
average, the difference in shares of the population aged 25 and older with at least a high 
school diploma was 4 percentage points for neighbors and 4.7 percentage points for non-
neighbors.
9
   
IV. Geography, Agglomeration, and Hierarchy 
 This section estimates of the effect of neighborness on employment cycle 
concordance by controlling for measures of geography, agglomeration, and urban 
hierarchy.  To control for city, state, and regional effects, I estimate two versions of the 
following regression equation: 
(2)                                         ,ln ijijjiij NC   ijXγ  
where αi and αj are city dummies and Nij equals 1 if i and j are contiguous and in the same 
metro area, and Xij is a vector of dummies indicating whether i and j have their principal 
cities in the same state, have outlying counties in the same state as the principal city or 
outlying counties of the other, or have principal cities in the same Census division.  The 
coefficient on Nij is the direct effect of neighborness.   
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 Hoynes (2000) and Engemann and Wall (2010) show how the effects of recessions are deeper for blacks 
and those with less than a high school degree.   
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 Results for the two versions of this model are provided in Table 5. The first 
version, Model A, allows for city-specific effects but assumes that there are no state and 
regional effects (i.e., it imposes the restriction that γ is a zero vector).  This estimation 
yields a statistically significant effect for being neighbors:  Controlling for the city-
specific differences in concordance, being neighbors tends to add 7.7 points to a city-
pair’s concordance [i.e., 100×(eβ – 1) = 7.7], which is same as the arithmetic difference.  
This result, however, does not account for the possibility of state and regional effects.  To 
do so, I remove the restriction on γ to obtain Model B and find that the higher-than-
average mean concordance between neighbors is due to the tendency for their principal 
cities to be in the same state, not to their being neighbors.  Specifically, the effect of 
being neighbors is statistically no different from zero, whereas having principal cities in 
the same state tends to add 13.3 points to the concordance between cities.  As is clear 
from the log likelihoods for the two models, the restriction that γ is a zero vector is easily 
rejected.
10
 
 As established above, it is not necessarily neighborness that accounts for the 
higher average concordance between neighboring cities, but perhaps the cities’ 
tendencies to lie principally in the same state.  The next step is to control for the potential 
roles of agglomeration and hierarchy, which I do by estimating 
  (3)                  ,ln ijijijijjiij NLNC   ijijij AθAλXγ  
                                                 
10
 The results of likelihood tests comparing all estimates in the paper are in an appendix. 
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where Aij is a vector of variables measuring the extent to which i and j are similarly 
agglomerated and Lij is a dummy that equals 1 if i and j are both the largest cities in their 
respective metro area.  To differentiate the importance of agglomeration for neighbors 
from that of non-neighbors, the agglomeration vector is also interacted with the Nij 
dummy.  Similarity in agglomeration is measured by log(1 -│ai - aj│/aiaj), where ai are 
the aj are the sizes (number of establishments) or densities (establishments per square 
mile) of i and j.
11
 
 Table 6 provides the estimation results for three versions of (3):  Model C 
imposes the restriction that agglomeration is unrelated to concordance ( =  = 0), Model 
D imposes the restriction that hierarchy is unrelated to concordance ( = 0), and Model E 
is unrestricted.  It is clear from the log likelihoods that the restrictions to obtain Models C 
and D are easily rejected, so Model E is preferred statistically.  In any event, the results 
from the two restricted models differ little from the unrestricted one, so the 
agglomeration variables are not strongly correlated with the hierarchy dummy. 
 According to Model E, the effect of neighborness is statistically no different from 
zero and there is a large effect for cities being in the same state, just as when 
agglomeration and hierarchy were not considered.  More interestingly, the coefficient on 
Lij is positive and statistically significant: when two cities are both the largest city in their 
metro area: their concordance tends to be 7.7 points higher than otherwise.  Further, 
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 The number of establishments is the average over 2000-2005 and is from the Census Bureau’s State and 
Metropolitan Area Data Book as of February 4, 2009.  Area is from the same source and is land area per 
square mile. 
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agglomeration also matters: In general, the more similar the two cities are in density, the 
more similar their employment cycles are, although size similarity is not significant.  On 
the other hand, the is no separate statistically significant link between concordance and 
agglomeration for neighbors. 
V. Industry and Human Capital 
 The final set of estimates controls for industry mix and human capital, which have 
been shown elsewhere to be important determinants of fluctuations at the subnational 
level.  If recessions and recoveries affect types of industries or people the same way, then 
cities that are similar in these regards might have similar employment cycles.  To test for 
this I include four variables, three of which are indices that convert the sum of the 
absolute differences in the relevant shares into a measure of similarity.  For example, to 
measure similarity in industry mix, I use Iij = log(1 - ∑k│xik - xjk│), where xik and xjk are 
the shares of total employment in industry k.
12 
 To control for human capital similarities, I 
use a racial similarity index that makes use of population racial shares, and an 
educational similarity index that uses the share of the population aged 25 and older with 
at least a high school diploma.
13
  To control for similarities in the sizes of employers, I 
include Eij = log(1 -│ei - ej│/eiej), where ei and ej are the mean establishment sizes in i 
and j.  Each of these four variables are included on their own and in interaction with the 
neighbor dummy.  Specifically, I estimate  
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 These shares are averaged over the sample period. 
13
 Race and education data are for 2006 from the State and Metropolitan Area Data Book. 
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where Hij is a vector of the two human capital similarity indices.   
 The estimation results for three versions of (4) are presented in Table 7:  Model F 
allows industrial similarity to matter but restricts the effects of human capital to zero ( = 
 = 0), Model G restricts the effects of industrial similarity to zero ( =  = 0) but allows 
human capital to matter, and Model H imposes no restrictions.  Notice that, although 
some of the new variables are statistically significant, likelihood ratio tests cannot reject 
the null that these specifications are statistically no different from Model E.  This means 
that the estimates of the coefficients on everything other than the industry and human 
capital variables are statistically the same across Models E-H.  Even so, the adjusted R
2
 
values suggest that the addition of these variables does provide additional explanatory 
power relative to Model E.  Finally, according to likelihood ratio tests, Models F and G 
are not statistically different from Model H and these three specifications are very similar 
in terms of goodness of fit. 
 As just noted, Model H provides the same results as Model E for the effects of 
geographic designations, agglomeration, and hierarchy.  For the industry variables 
introduced in (4), note that concordance is unrelated to industrial mix, regardless of 
whether the cities are neighbors or not.  On the other hand, mean establishment size is 
related to concordance, but only for neighbors—neighboring cities with similarly sized 
firms tend to have similar employment cycles.  From the results for Model F it is clear 
that the qualitative results for the industry variables would be obtained whether or not the 
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human capital variables are included.  On the other hand, the magnitude of the coefficient 
on mean establishment size for neighbors does change when human capital variables are 
included, a point I return to below. 
 Of the human capital variables included in Model H, only the two that are 
interacted with the neighbor dummy are statistically significant.  Specifically, the more 
similar their levels of high school attainment, the more similar are neighbors’ 
employment cycles.  But, the more similar their racial mix, the less similar their 
employment cycles.  It is striking that human capital similarity is important only for 
neighboring cities and do not reflect of a general effect between any two cities.  Because 
of this, the results cannot be reflections of how racial and educational categories affected 
over the cycle.  Instead, it must have something to do with the fact that neighbors’ labor 
markets are somewhat integrated. 
 Keep in mind that employment data are based on the locations of jobs and that 
race and education data are based on the locations of potential employees.  In principle, 
any resident in one city is a potential employee in either neighboring city, as long as they 
are willing to bear the commuting costs.  If we think of educational similarity as a 
measure of the employment substitutability of residents of one city for residents of the 
other, then neighboring cities that have similar levels of educational attainment will have 
more-integrated labor markets.  Therefore, neighbors’ employment cycles will be more 
similar to one another the more similar the cities’ educational attainment. 
16 
 
 The negative relationship between concordance and racial similarity might be 
counterintuitive at first glance, but it is consistent with spatial/racial mismatch.  For 
whatever reason, there is a tendency for cities to be divided internally by race and, on a 
larger scale, for the largest city in a metro area to have a higher concentration of minority 
groups.
14
  Potential employers, however, are spread more evenly across two neighboring 
cities.
15
  The greater the spatial/racial mismatch between cities, the more likely it is that 
members of every racial group will commute between their city of residence and their 
city of employment.  Therefore, the less similar two neighbors are in their racial 
composition, the more commuting there will be between the cities, and the more 
integrated will be their labor markets.  
 As is seen from a comparison of Models G and H, the inclusion of the industry 
variables is important in obtaining these results.  In Model G, racial mix is statistically 
insignificant and the coefficient on high school attainment is much larger.  Statistically, 
the reason that the results from Model H differ from those from Models F and G is that 
there is a strong correlation for differences in mean establishment size and race for 
neighbors, but not for non-neighbors: For neighbors, the correlation between racial 
similarity index and establishment size similarity is 0.727, whereas it is 0.137 for non-
neighbors.  Because of this correlation, the link between racial similarity and 
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 Martin (2004) and Hellerstein, Neumark, and McInerney (2008) provide recent estimates of the extent of 
spatial/racial mismatch.  
15
 This is, admittedly, a very partial-equilibrium explanation and takes the location of employers and 
residents as given.  Because the present concern is with relatively high-frequency events, however, mobility 
is most likely a secondary concern.  See Arnott (1998) for a general equilibrium treatment of spatial 
mismatch. 
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concordance for neighbors is not obtained unless mean establishment size is controlled 
for.  Explanations for why this correlation exists, and why it is for neighbors alone, are 
lacking in the existing literature.  However, the fact that it holds only for neighbors 
suggests that it has something to do with the interrelated formation and evolution of 
neighboring cities.  
VI. Concluding Remarks  
 On average, the employment cycles of neighboring cities are more similar to one 
another than are the cycles of non-neighboring cities.  However, this is not due to their 
neighborness directly, but to the tendency for neighboring cities to be in the same state.  
Neighborness does, however, interact with industry and human capital in ways that make 
the cyclical interaction of neighbors different from that of non-neighbors.  According to 
my most general specification, Model H, similarities in neighbors’ employment cycles 
are related to similarities in mean establishment size, racial composition, and educational 
attainment.   
 To put the results from Model H into perspective, Table 8 provides the estimated 
coefficients in terms of concordance points.  The coefficients for the three statistically 
significant dummy variables were converted as above, whereas the effect for the other 
significant variables are measured as one standard deviation increases in the relevant 
similarity index.  As noted above, geographic designation is important and the effect of 
being in the same state is relatively large:  All else equal, the concordance of two non-
neighbors in the same state tends to be 12.2 points higher than it is for non-neighbors in 
18 
 
different states.  The urban hierarchy matters in that the concordance of two cities at the 
top of their metro area’s hierarchy tend to be 6.3 points higher than otherwise.  Finally, 
agglomeration is important too: The concordance for a city pair that is one-standard 
deviation more similar than average will tend to be 3.6 points higher, all else equal.   
 Neighborness is related to concordance only through its interaction with the 
characteristics of employers and employees in the neighboring cities.  Concordance tends 
to be 7 points higher for neighbors whose similarity in mean establishment size is one-
standard deviation above average, all else equal.  For racial and educational similarity, 
the effects are -5.1 points and 3.5 points, respectively.  The negative link between 
concordance and racial similarity is consistent with spatial/racial mismatch.  The positive 
link between concordance and similarity in educational attainment is consistent with the 
idea that educational similarity indicates the extent to which the residents of the two cities 
are substitutes for each other. 
  
19 
 
  
Appendix: Likelihood Ratios 
  A   B   C   D   E   F   G  
B 3 21.15 *                
C 4 28.95 * 1 7.80 *              
D 7 30.85 * 4 9.70 * non-nested            
E 8 37.93 * 5 16.78 * 4 8.98 † 1 7.08 *          
F 12 42.04 * 9 20.89 * 8 13.09 * 5 11.19 * 4 4.11        
G 12 43.47 * 9 22.32 * 8 14.52 * 5 12.62 * 4 5.54  non-nested    
H 16 45.55 * 13 24.39 * 12 16.60 * 9 14.70 * 8 7.62  4 3.51  4 2.08  
The number in italics is the number of restrictions imposed to obtain the nested model.  A * or † indicates 
statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet ██ ████ █                                      ██ ███ ███ ████                █ ████
Gary █    ██ ██        █                        ███ ████ ███ ███ ███          ██ █   █   ████
Lake County-Kenosha                                            ███ ███ ███ ████ ███ ███ ████ ███ ███ ████
Dallas-Plano-Irving    ███ ██                                     ██ ███ ███ ██                   ████
Fort Worth-Arlington   ████ ██                                   ████ ███ ███ ███                   ███
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn ██ ████ ███ ███ ████                               ███ ███ ████ ███ ███ ████ ███ ███ ████
Warren-Farmington Hills-Troy   ██                              █         ████ █      ███        ████ ███ ███ ████
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale ██ ████ ███ ███ ███                              ██ ███ ███ ██                  █ ████
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine ██ ████ ███ ███ ███                              ██ ███                   ██ ███ ████
Ft. Lauderdale-Pomp. Bch-Deerfield Bch ██ ████ █                                                              █ ███ ████
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall ██ ████ █                                      ██ ███ ███ ██                  █ ████
W. Palm Bch-Boca Raton-Boynton Bch ██ ████ █  █                                                          ███ ███ ████
Edison ██ ████                                                                   ████
Nassau-Suffolk ██ ████ ███ █                                  ███ █                          ████
Newark-Union ██ ████ ███ █                                                  █             ████
New York-Wayne-White Plains ██ ████ ███ ██                                  ██ ███ ███ ██                    ███
Camden ██ ████ ██                                                                 ████
Philadelphia ██ ████ ███ █                                   ██ ███ ███ ████                  ███
Wilmington   ████ ██                                    ███ ███ ███                     ████
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward    ███ ███ ███ ████ ██                           ██ ███ ███ ████ ███ ███ ████ ███ ███ ████
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City ██ ████ ███ ███ ████ ██                          ███ ███ ███ ████ ██               ████
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett               █                             ███ ███ ███ █                      ██
Tacoma    █                                      █ ████ ██                        █ ████
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria ██ ████ ███                                                                 ███
Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithersburg ██ ████ ███ ██          ██ ██                    ███   █ ███ ████         ██ ███ ███ ████
Table 1. City-Level Employment Cycles
A █ indicates a quarter in which the city was in an employment contraction.  The shaded areas are the periods during which national employment was in contraction (Owyang, Piger, and Wall, 2010).
20011990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20082002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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Table 2. Mean Concordances 
MSA Metro Division (City) 
With 
Neighbor(s) 
With All 
Cities 
Chicago-Naperville-
Joliet, Il-IN-WI 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL 74.3 80.4 
Gary, IN 78.9 71.1 
Lake County-Kenosha, Il-WI 69.7 63.0 
Dallas-Fort Worth-
Arlington, TX 
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX 
93.4 
80.1 
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 78.5 
Detroit-Warren-
Livonia, MI 
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI 
59.2 
62.7 
Warren-Farmington Hills-Troy, MI 67.5 
Los Angeles-Long 
Beach-Santa Ana, CA 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 
88.2 
77.5 
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 74.3 
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-
Pompano Beach, FL 
Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach, FL 89.5 76.0 
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL 82.9 81.3 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach, FL 96.1 74.8 
New York-Northern 
New Jersey-Long 
Island, NY-NJ-PA 
Edison, NJ 88.2 76.6 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 86.8 79.1 
Newark-Union, NJ-PA 88.2 76.6 
New York-Wayne-White Plains, NY-NJ 82.9 79.9 
Philadelphia-Camden-
Wilmington, PA-NJ-
DE-MD 
Camden, NJ 82.9 77.9 
Philadelphia, PA 83.6 79.7 
Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ 86.2 80.1 
San Francisco-
Oakland-Fremont, CA 
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 
76.3 
60.0 
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA 71.3 
Seattle-Tacoma-
Bellevue, WA 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 
84.2 
72.8 
Tacoma, WA 73.0 
Washington-Arlington-
Alexandria, DC-VA-
MD-WV 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, MD 
65.8 
77.0 
Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithersburg, DC-VA-MD-WV 69.5 
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Table 3. Mean Concordance within  
Geographic Designations 
All City Pairs 74.4 
 
Yes No 
Neighbors 81.7 74.0 
Same Principal State 83.5 73.9 
Same Secondary State 79.3 74.2 
Same Census Division 78.0 73.6 
Table 4. Cross-City Differences in Measures of Agglomeration,  
Industry Mix, and Human Capital 
 Neighbors Non-Neighbors 
Establishments, Thousands 95.2 65.5 
Establishments per Square Mile 41.0 30.4 
Sum of Differences in Industry Shares 19.8 25.4 
Mean Establishment Size 1.8 3.0 
Sum of Differences in Race Shares
a
 21.7 26.1 
Difference in Share with HS Diploma 4.0 4.7 
a White, Black, Asian, and American Indian or Alaska Native 
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Table 5. Concordance and Geographic Similarity 
 
     Model A 
 
 Model B 
 
Coeff. 
 
s.e. 
 
Coeff. 
 
s.e. 
Constant 4.465 * 0.021 
 
4.477 * 0.022 
Neighbor 0.075 * 0.027 
 
-0.011  0.024 
Principal State 
    
0.124 * 0.033 
Secondary State 
    
-0.025  0.024 
Census Division 
    
0.036  0.022 
Gary -0.124 * 0.021 
 
-0.129 * 0.020 
Lake County-Kenosha -0.255 * 0.043 
 
-0.259 * 0.042 
Dallas-Plano-Irving -0.002  0.017 
 
-0.008  0.017 
Fort Worth-Arlington -0.024  0.019 
 
-0.029  0.019 
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn -0.262 * 0.046 
 
-0.273 * 0.047 
Warren-Farmington Hills-Troy -0.178 * 0.028 
 
-0.188 * 0.027 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale -0.036 † 0.021 
 
-0.059 * 0.019 
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine -0.078 * 0.020 
 
-0.101 * 0.020 
Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach -0.065 * 0.027 
 
-0.079 * 0.027 
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall 0.013  0.013 
 
-0.004  0.016 
W. Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach -0.077 * 0.026 
 
-0.094 * 0.027 
Edison -0.063 * 0.031 
 
-0.074 * 0.029 
Nassau-Suffolk -0.021  0.023 
 
-0.033  0.023 
Newark-Union -0.061 * 0.027 
 
-0.071 * 0.026 
New York-Wayne-White Plains -0.012  0.018 
 
-0.012  0.019 
Camden -0.046  0.031 
 
-0.057 * 0.028 
Philadelphia -0.011  0.017 
 
-0.013  0.017 
Wilmington -0.007  0.017 
 
-0.003  0.019 
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward -0.313 * 0.050 
 
-0.335 * 0.051 
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City -0.124 * 0.028 
 
-0.146 * 0.026 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett -0.105 * 0.022 
 
-0.117 * 0.022 
Tacoma -0.106 * 0.027 
 
-0.117 * 0.028 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria -0.055 † 0.031 
 
-0.059 † 0.030 
Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithersburg 4.465 * 0.021 
 
4.477 * 0.022 
Log Likelihood       223.917 
 
234.494 
R
2
       0.530 
 
0.558 
Adjusted R
2
       0.487 
 
0.512 
City effects are measured relative to the excluded city, Chicago-Naperville-Joliet.  A * or † 
indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Agglomeration and Central Places 
  
 Model C 
 
 Model D   Model E 
  
Coeff. 
 
s.e. 
 
Coeff. 
 
s.e.  Coeff. s.e. 
Constant 
 
4.428 * 0.024 
 
4.493 * 0.025 4.438 * 0.031 
Neighbor 
 
0.002  0.023 
 
-0.015 
 
0.044 -0.003 0.042 
Principal State 
 
0.120 * 0.031 
 
0.105 * 0.034 0.101 * 0.032 
Secondary State 
 
-0.022  0.025 
 
-0.023 
 
0.026 -0.022 0.026 
Census Division 
 
0.038 † 0.022 
 
0.041 † 0.022 0.043 † 0.022 
Largest Cities 
 
0.075 * 0.025 
    
 0.073 * 0.027 
Size  
     
-0.000 
 
0.623 -0.414 0.672 
Neighbor*Size 
     
1.066 
 
1.865 1.042 1.778 
Density 
     
1.219 * 0.371 1.216 * 0.360 
Neighbor*Density 
     
-0.993 
 
1.050 -0.967 0.995 
Gary 
 
-0.099 * 0.023 
 
-0.038 
 
0.032 -0.023 0.031 
Lake County-Kenosha 
 
-0.229 * 0.044 
 
-0.259 * 0.042 -0.234 * 0.044 
Dallas-Plano-Irving 
 
-0.007  0.016 
 
0.006 
 
0.018 0.009 0.017 
Fort Worth-Arlington 
 
0.001  0.021 
 
0.010 
 
0.022 0.041 † 0.025 
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn 
 
-0.272 * 0.047 
 
-0.268 * 0.046 -0.266 * 0.046 
Warren-Farmington Hills-Troy 
 
-0.158 * 0.028 
 
-0.186 * 0.028 -0.154 * 0.029 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale 
 
-0.057 * 0.016 
 
-0.052 * 0.019 -0.051 * 0.017 
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine 
 
-0.070 * 0.022 
 
-0.086 * 0.021 -0.054 * 0.024 
Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerf. Beach 
 
-0.049 † 0.028 
 
-0.077 * 0.028 -0.046 0.030 
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall 
 
-0.003  0.014 
 
-0.004 
 
0.017 -0.001 0.016 
W. Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach 
 
-0.064 * 0.027 
 
-0.090 * 0.028 -0.059 * 0.029 
Edison 
 
-0.045  0.031 
 
-0.074 * 0.031 -0.043 0.034 
Nassau-Suffolk 
 
-0.003  0.024 
 
-0.023 
 
0.025 0.008 0.027 
Newark-Union 
 
-0.041  0.028 
 
-0.072 * 0.027 -0.041 0.031 
New York-Wayne-White Plains 
 
-0.013  0.016 
 
0.006 
 
0.021 0.005 0.019 
Camden 
 
-0.028  0.029 
 
-0.054 † 0.028 -0.026 0.030 
Philadelphia 
 
-0.013  0.014 
 
-0.011 
 
0.018 -0.010 0.016 
Wilmington 
 
0.026  0.021 
 
0.006 
 
0.021 0.028 0.021 
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward 
 
-0.305 * 0.052 
 
-0.333 * 0.052 -0.302 * 0.053 
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City 
 
-0.139 * 0.024 
 
-0.140 * 0.026 -0.130 * 0.024 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett 
 
-0.113 * 0.022 
 
-0.109 * 0.022 -0.103 * 0.022 
Tacoma 
 
-0.087 * 0.028 
 
-0.056 † 0.030 -0.037 0.029 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria 
 
-0.056 † 0.031 
 
-0.058 † 0.031 -0.053 † 0.032 
Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithersburg 
 
-0.120 * 0.026 
 
-0.150 * 0.025 -0.121 * 0.027 
Log Likelihood 
 
238.393 
 
239.342  242.883 
R
2
 
 
0.569 
 
0.518  0.527 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.466 
 
0.460  0.468 
City effects are measured relative to the excluded city, Chicago-Naperville-Joliet.  A * or † indicates statistical 
significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
  
27 
 
Table 7. Industry Mix and Human Capital 
  
 Model F 
 
 Model G   Model H 
  
Coeff. 
 
s.e. 
 
Coeff. 
 
s.e.  Coeff. s.e. 
Constant 
 
4.441 * 0.035 
 
4.458 * 0.034 4.459 * 0.037 
Neighbor 
 
-0.005  0.094 
 
0.082  0.052 0.020  0.085 
Principal State 
 
0.113 * 0.033 
 
0.108 * 0.033 0.114 * 0.035 
Secondary State 
 
-0.028  0.027 
 
-0.019  0.026 -0.033  0.028 
Census Division 
 
0.045 * 0.022 
 
0.045 † 0.023 0.048 * 0.023 
Largest Cities 
 
0.070 * 0.027 
 
0.063 * 0.027 0.061 * 0.028 
Size  
 
-0.421  0.673 
 
-0.436  0.680 -0.438  0.679 
Neighbor*Size 
 
-0.386  1.771 
 
2.257  1.779 -1.081  2.273 
Density 
 
1.192 * 0.369 
 
1.244 * 0.362 1.255 * 0.368 
Neighbor*Density 
 
0.832  1.142 
 
-1.060  1.028 1.440  1.397 
Industrial Mix 
 
-0.022  0.080 
    
 -0.028  0.083 
Neighbor*Industrial Mix 
 
-0.322  0.461 
    
 -0.253  0.393 
Mean Establishment Size 
 
0.345  1.059 
    
 0.559  1.027 
Neighbor*Mean Establishment Size 
 
9.243 * 3.832 
    
 12.91 * 5.526 
Racial Mix  
     
0.007  0.063 0.001  0.065 
Neighbor*Racial Mix 
     
0.021  0.075 -0.195 † 0.117 
Share with a HS Diploma 
     
0.285  0.198 0.300  0.202 
Neighbor*Share with a HS Diploma 
     
1.597 * 0.553 1.043 * 0.521 
Gary 
 
-0.030  0.031 
 
-0.028  0.031 -0.032  0.031 
Lake County-Kenosha 
 
-0.238 * 0.046 
 
-0.239 * 0.043 -0.245 * 0.045 
Dallas-Plano-Irving 
 
0.006  0.018 
 
0.012  0.019 0.014  0.019 
Fort Worth-Arlington 
 
0.035  0.025 
 
0.037  0.026 0.036  0.026 
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn 
 
-0.259 * 0.047 
 
-0.258 * 0.057 -0.257 * 0.059 
Warren-Farmington Hills-Troy 
 
-0.154 * 0.032 
 
-0.154 * 0.030 -0.160 * 0.032 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale 
 
-0.057 * 0.018 
 
-0.029  0.022 -0.032  0.023 
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine 
 
-0.062 * 0.026 
 
-0.055 * 0.027 -0.062 * 0.028 
Ft. Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerf. Beach 
 
-0.043  0.033 
 
-0.052 † 0.030 -0.044  0.033 
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall 
 
0.000  0.018 
 
0.021  0.021 0.024  0.023 
W. Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach 
 
-0.058 † 0.034 
 
-0.070 * 0.030 -0.063 † 0.034 
Edison 
 
-0.046  0.034 
 
-0.048  0.034 -0.051  0.033 
Nassau-Suffolk 
 
0.012  0.028 
 
0.007  0.028 0.013  0.028 
Newark-Union 
 
-0.044  0.031 
 
-0.050  0.031 -0.051  0.031 
New York-Wayne-White Plains 
 
0.002  0.021 
 
0.016  0.020 0.011  0.022 
Camden 
 
-0.034  0.031 
 
-0.039  0.031 -0.042  0.032 
Philadelphia 
 
-0.013  0.017 
 
-0.017  0.017 -0.017  0.018 
Wilmington 
 
0.021  0.022 
 
0.016  0.022 0.015  0.023 
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward 
 
-0.310 * 0.055 
 
-0.312 * 0.057 -0.318 * 0.059 
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City 
 
-0.139 * 0.026 
 
-0.136 * 0.032 -0.144 * 0.033 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett 
 
-0.107 * 0.024 
 
-0.098 * 0.024 -0.100 * 0.025 
Tacoma 
 
-0.045  0.031 
 
-0.041  0.029 -0.045  0.031 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria 
 
-0.057  0.040 
 
-0.054  0.036 -0.059  0.043 
Bethesda-Frederick-Gaithersburg 
 
-0.125 * 0.030 
 
-0.121 * 0.029 -0.124 * 0.032 
Log Likelihood 
 
244.938 
 
245.652  246.691 
R
2
 
 
0.588 
 
0.590  0.592 
Adjusted R
2 
 
0.529 
 
0.532  0.528 
City effects are measured relative to the excluded city, Chicago-Naperville-Joliet.  A * or † indicates statistical 
significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Summary of Effects on Concordance, Model H 
 
Concordance Points 
Cities in the Same Principal State 12.1 
Cities in the Same Census Division 4.9 
Cities are Both the Largest in Their Metro Areas 6.3 
Similarity in Density Between Any Cities
a 
3.6 
Similarity in Mean Establishment Size Between Neighbors
a
 7.0 
Racial Similarity Between Neighbors
a
 -5.1 
Educational Similarity Between Neighbors
a
 3.5 
The table includes only those variables that are statistically significant.  a Evaluated as the 
difference between the mean and one standard deviation above the mean. 
 
 
  
